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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-1 (a) Utah Code Annotated 1953. The complaint 
by Sew Easy was originally filed alleging fiduciary breaches 
of Defendant Montague as a former employee. Montague 
counter-claimed alleging tortious interference with his new 
competitive business by Sew Easy, his former employer. This 
appeal by Sew Easy is from a $50,000 default judgment 
entered against it on Montague's counter-claim. Montague 
procured an ex-parte default from the clerk on the counter-
claim on the grounds that Sew Easy had failed to answer 
process or appear. Sew Easy filed a written reply even 
though the complaint was a reply and the case continued 
normal prosecution as though no default had been entered. 
The discovery proceeded until interrupted by a motion to 
compel discovery and a counter-motion for a protective 
order, but the Judge never ruled on the motions. After Sew 
Easy sued the Judge in an unrelated matter and their counsel 
caused the Judge to be found in contempt of the Supreme 
Court, the Judge issued an order show cause why the suit 
should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Sew Easy 
failed to appear and the Judge, rather than dismiss the suit 
as noticed, bifurcated the suit, dismissed the complaint, 
entered an order and judgment of default for $50,000 against 
Sew Easy on the counter-claim without any evidentiary 
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hearing on either the claimed default or the amount of the 
unliquidated damages. From the time of the ex-parte 
dismissal-unnoticed default judgment hearing to the time of 
entry of the default judgment, the court entered Montague's 
proposed default order before Sew Easy's timely objections 
were filed and then waited until after Montague's untimely 
reply to objections was filed and then entered the default 
judgment without ruling on the objections. No evidentiary 
hearing on the amount of the unliquidated damages was held. 
Sew Easy was never given formal notice of entry of the 
default judgment and had not received either constructive or 
actual notice of the entry of the default judgment until 
less than 30 days before the filing of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the default judgment erroneous and void as a 
matter of law and entered in violation of due process of law 
because the procedures leading to its entry violated the 
procedural rules and because the Judge was acting under the 
burden of implied and express malice against Sew Easy and 
its counsel? 
2. Was the default judgment also void because no 
evidentiary damage hearing was held to liquidate and 
determine the amount of the alleged tortious interference 
damages suffered? 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, ARTICLE I Section 7 [Due process of 
law. ] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5. Service and Filing 
of Pleadings and Other Papers. (a) Service: When 
Required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
every order required by its terms to be served, every 
pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the 
court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, every 
paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written 
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every 
written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
designation of record on appeal, and similar paper shall be 
served upon each of the parties. No service need be made on 
parties in default for failure to appear except that 
pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief 
against them shall be served upon them in the manner 
provided for service of summons in Rule 4.... 
(b) Service: How Made. (1) Whenever under these rules 
service is required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon 
the attorney unless service upon the party himself is 
ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a 
party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by 
mailing it to him at his known address or, if no address is 
known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery 
of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the 
attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his office with 
his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, if there is 
no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; 
of, if the office is closed or the person to be served has 
no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon 
mailing.... 
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(d) Filing• All papers after the complaint required to 
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either 
before service or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 7. Pleadings Allowed; 
Motions and Orders. (a) OMITTED 
(b) Motions, Orders and Other Papers. (1) Motions. An 
application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made 
in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds 
therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. 
The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is 
stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion. 
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the 
court including a minute order made and entered in writing 
and not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of 
money may be enforced by execution in the same manner as if 
it were a judgment. Except as otherwise specifically 
provided by these rules, any order made without notice to 
the adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice 
by the judge who made it, or may be vacated or modified on 
notice. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 55. Default.... (b) 
Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by 
computation be made certain and the defendant has been 
personally served otherwise than by publication or by 
personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon 
request of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount 
due and costs against the defendant, if he has been 
defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant 
or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled 
to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. 
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth 
of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or 
order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the 
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment 
by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 58A. Entry.... 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the signing 
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or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file 
proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. 
However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not 
affected by the notice requirement of this provision. 
Rules of Practice—District and Circuit Court. Rule 2.9. 
Written orders, judgments, and decrees. (a) In all rulings 
by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the court a proposed 
order, judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and/or 
orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the court for signature unless the court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within (5) days after 
service. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff, hereafter "Sew Easy" filed the complaint 
against the defendant, hereafter "Montague" alleging that he 
breached fiduciary obligations as a former employee in 
starting a competitive business and intentionally interfered 
with a Sew Easy supplier (R. pgs. 1 - 3 ) . Montague 
eventually answered and counter-claimed in verbatim reverse 
that Sew Easy had interfered with the same supplier to his 
new competitive business, a claim inherently denied on the 
face of the complaint not requiring any other reply under 
the rules (R. pgs. 16 - 18). Montague, the defendant 
without filing the required motion or giving notice, went 
ex-parte to the clerk on the false pre-text that Sew Easy, 
the plaintiff was a non-appearing party defendant not 
entitled to notice who had defaulted in answering an 
original summons. Montague in this manner obtained from the 
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clerk the entry of a void ex-parte default on the counter-
claim (R. pgs. 21 - 22). After receiving a copy of the 
entered ex-parte default, Sew Easy filed another reply (R. 
pgs. 30-31). The parties proceeded into interrogatories and 
depositions as though the erroneous default was void and of 
no effect. The prosecution of the case was blocked by the 
judge's continuing refusal to rule on a motion to compel 
discovery and a counter-motion for a protective order (R. 
pgs. 32 - 35) . 
Long after the judge should have timely ruled on the 
motions, the same judge in an unrelated case was found, by 
the Court of Appeals, to have been in long term contempt of 
a Supreme Court order for his suppressing of a transcript. 
Sew Easy's counsel procured the contempt finding (R. pgs. 
104a - 115a). Shortly before the contempt finding, Sew Easy 
also through the same counsel, added the judge as a 
defendant for injunctive relief in an unrelated civil rights 
action in Federal Court. Thereafter, without ruling on the 
pending discovery motions, the judge sua sponte ordered a 
hearing to show cause why the suit should not be dismissed 
for lack of prosecution, which he was then obstructing. The 
show cause order specified that a party's failure to appear 
constituted concurrence in dismissal of the suit. Sew 
Easy's written objections to dismissal were delivered late 
to the court because of clerical error in mailing rather 
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impaired operating cash, gave stop work instructions to 
subordinates, converted trade secrets, etc. and others (R. 
pgs. 1 - 3 ) . Montague's eventual answer after denial of a 
motion to dismiss included a compulsory counter-claim that 
Sew Easy had tortiously interfered with business 
relationships in its futile attempts to rehabilitate the 
alienated key supplier on a non-exclusive basis to mitigate 
their damages (R. pgs. 16 - 18). The counter-claim was in 
verbatim reverse to the complaint's interference 
allegations. 
3. Ex-Parte Default - Reply: In between discovery 
proceedings, Montague presented an ex parte a Precipe for 
default to the court (R. pgs. 21 - 22). The clerk signed 
and entered the Default without the required motion or 
notice. The ex-parte default included a false finding that 
Sew Easy had been served with process and failed to appear 
and answer defendant's counter-claim (R. pgs. 19 - 20). Sew 
Easy then incorporated in another "reply" the denial 
inherent in its complaint (R. pgs. 30 - 31) reinforced by 
defenses raised in a deposition and answers to 
interrogatories (R. pgs. 32-35). 
The case then proceeded as though there was a reply 
until after the dismissal of the suit for lack of 
prosecution. 
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4. Sua Sponte Dismissal: The court arbitrarily and 
prematurely issued an order to show cause on September 13, 
1988 why the suit should not be dismissed for lack of 
prosecution (R. pgs. 51 - 52). The court itself had blocked 
prosecution by failure to rule on discovery motions which 
had been ripe for ruling for over nine months and were never 
ruled on by the court (R. pgs. 48 - 50.). 
The order to show cause expressly provided that failure 
to appear would be considered a consent to dismissal of the 
suit (R. pgs. 51 - 52). 
Sew Easy elected to appear by written objections and by 
reviving court blocked discovery but a clerical error of 
mailing rather than hand delivery resulted in Sew Easy's 
failure to appear. The resulting court dismissal order was 
never served on Sew Easy (R. pgs. 50). 
Sew Easy on oral notice of the dismissal elected to re-
file the complaint after the judge's announced retirement in 
order to avoid a confrontation over disqualification, Rule 
60B U.R.C.P. and other possible corrective motions (R. pgs. 
94a - 99a). 
5. Spurious Default Judgment Proceedings after 
Dismissal: The show cause hearing was held and dismissal 
was ordered on September 26, 1988 (R. pg. 53). The day 
following, on September 27, 1988 Montague's counsel prepared 
and submitted to the judge and mailed to Sew Easy an 
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affidavit regarding costs and attorney's fees, and also on 
that same day submitted the form of an order dismissing the 
complaint which had already been dismissed by minute order. 
The proposed order also contained an order for the clerk to 
enter a default judgment on the counter-claim in the amount 
of $50,000 plus fees and costs (R. pgs. 65 - 66). On 
September 29, 1988 the judge signed the order, but no copy 
of the signed order was mailed to Sew Easy. The clerk then 
entered that order of default on the 29th of September, 1988 
and no notice was given of the clerk's entry of said default 
order (R. pg. 67). 
Sew Easy, who had been served with the proposed order 
and affidavit on September 27, 1988, by mailing, filed an 
objection to the entry of the default judgment on the 
counter-claim on September 30, the date of the receipt in 
the mail of the proposed counter-claim default order. 
However, it was a day after the judge had signed the said 
default order reciting the suit dismissal hearing as 
justification. 
Montague also mailed to the Plaintiff a proposed form 
for default judgment on September 27, 1988 which was also 
received by Sew Easy on September 30, 1988 (R. pgs. 73 -
74). However, the proposed form for the default judgment 
was not filed with the court until October 3, 1988, which 
was three days after Sew Easy filed its objections to entry 
11 
of the default order (R. pgs. 68 - 69). The judge took no 
action with respect to the default judgment until after he 
received Montague's dilatory response to plaintiff's 
objection to entry of default judgment on counter-claim (R. 
pgs, 70 - 72). It was later discovered that on October 26, 
1988, the day after the judge received Montague's response 
to the objections, he signed the default judgment, striking 
out its typed in date of the 27th of September, 1988 and 
writing in the 26th of October, 1988. 
6. No Damage Hearing - No Notice of Default Order or 
Judgment Entry: Subseguent to that October 25th Montague 
reply, both Sew Easy and Montague because, they received no 
notice to the contrary, waited again as though the Judge was 
simply totally defaulting as he had done on the discovery 
motions with no ruling on either the motion or objection. 
Sew Easy also knew that in the worst of all cases they were 
entitled as a matter of law and under the well-known 
practice of this judge to an evidentiary hearing fixing the 
unliguidated and unprovable damages before there was a final 
appealable default judgment. 
7. Timely Notice of Appeal - Cost Bond and Docketing 
Statement: Sew Easy first discovered on March 8, 1989 from 
examination of the file that the Judge had entered this 
default on October 25, 1988, the same day Montague's reply 
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was filed. (R. pgs. 94a - 98a). Sew Easy filed its notice 
of appeal on April 20, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The great risk in arguing this case is that the 
cumulative gross errors and denials of due process resulting 
in the entry of this default judgment on an unliquidated 
compulsory counter-claim are so numerous, outrageous and 
unbelievable that the credibility of the messenger is 
instantly suspect to the serious judicial mind. The 
conclusion appears inescapable that Montague's counsel was 
aware that there were no limits on his raw power to obtain 
from the biased judge the progressive ex-parte orders 
necessary to his nefarious purposes of obtaining an ex-parte 
judgment without any notice or opportunity to be heard and 
denying Sew Easy its day in court on the counter-claim 
issues. It appears likely that Montague's counsel acted 
with increasing confidence that the judge was out looking 
for an opportunity to break all the rules to retaliate 
against Sew Easy and its counsel for the embarrassing Hardy 
fiasco and the Sew Easy civil rights case against the judge. 
The claim of due process denying absurdities begins with an 
ex-parte "precipe for default" against a represented party 
plaintiff resulting immediately in the entry of an ex-parte 
default against the plaintiff on the counter-claim which had 
been substantively replied to. Due process required a 
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motion, right to oppose and argue the claimed default, which 
at worst would have resulted in an order to file another 
reply. The judge while refusing to rule on the proper 
motions on discovery, and after being sued and found in 
contempt concurrently ordered a show cause hearing for, 
dismissal of the "case" for lack of prosecution to clear it 
from his calendar which would have been a welcomed relief to 
Sew Easy. The judge violated the scope of his own order. 
He used Sew Easy's inadvertent non-appearance as a 
springboard to entry without prior or subsequent notice of 
(1) a dismissal of the complaint only; (2) then ordered a 
default judgment on the counter-claim; (3) then weeks later 
entered the default judgment on an unliquidated compulsory 
counter-claim for a rounded $50,000.00 plus costs and 
attorney's fees for "tortious interference" without the 
required evidentiary damage hearing. This is perhaps the 
clearest case imaginable of the denial of a right to a day 
in court to present evidence before the taking of property 
under the color of authority of the state. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGE'S IMPLIED MALICE ALONE WOULD VOID 
THE JUDGMENT AND WHEN ADDED TO THE OTHER 
GROSS PROCEDURAL ABORTIONS EVINCES AN 
OUTRAGEOUS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND A 
MALICIOUS COURSE OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT. 
Even if arguendo, all the patently extra-legal 
procedures had been regular that led to the default 
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judgment, it was a gross denial of due process for Judge 
Christoffersen to act in this case. Sew Easy's counsel had 
caused the judge to be found in contempt of the Supreme 
Court with a spin off civil rights action against the judge 
by counsel and the plaintiff, with the same counsel, had 
sued the judge for injunctive relief in another unrelated 
civil rights action. 
The fact that the judge also repeatedly violated the 
procedural rules, always to the prejudice of Sew Easy, and 
always to the benefit of Montague, becomes powerful and 
perhaps conclusive circumstantial evidence that the judge 
was driven by express malice against Sew Easy and its 
counsel. 
See Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d. 520; 46 
Am. Jur. 2d. Judges Sec. 86. 
II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGE 
COUNTER-CLAIM IS VOID FOR LACK OF THE 
REQUIRED DAMAGE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The default "judgment" is void on the separate grounds 
that that the trial court failed to follow Rule 55 (b) (2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in entering the 
judgment. That rule as applied by this Court clearly 
reguires that, where default judgment is for other than a 
sum certain or an amount that by computation can be made 
certain, a hearing had to be conducted by the trial court to 
ascertain the amount of the damages to which the defendant 
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was entitled. Russell v. Martell, 681 P. 2d. 1193 (Utah 
1984); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch Inc., Utah, 589 P. 2d. 767 
(1978) and J.P.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. Naef, Utah, 604 P. 
2d. 486 (1979). The record is clear that such a hearing is 
required and that none noticed or held. This variance is an 
independent grounds for summary reversal and in other cases 
the same judge has always required the damage evidentiary 
hearing. 
III. THE DEFAULT - THE ORIGINAL DEFAULT, THE DEFAULT 
ORDER AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT WERE ALL VOID AND 
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS. 
The face of the record facts as detailed reveals the 
application of a specious but popular local doctrine of 
judicial interpretation of procedural and other rules in 
order to infinitely enlarge the judicial discretion and 
convenience of the judge or a "favored" party, even though 
the other party's rights may be adversely affected by the 
judicially self-serving interpretation. 
The applications of this specious local doctrine are 
legion in the record of this case. It was no offense to the 
judge that Montague's counsel procured the ex-parte first 
default entry from his clerk on the (false, pre-textual) 
grounds that Sew Easy had failed to answer process and 
failed to appear. The doctrine reasons that this innocent 
error was not a "material" variance from the rules and 
promotes judicial efficiency. The local doctrine holds that 
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objections to be filed. Then after timely objections were 
filed, the judge ignored the requirement of first ruling on 
the objections. Then upon receipt of the very dilatory 
reply he immediately signed and entered the well rounded 
$50,000.00 tort based default judgment without an 
evidentiary hearing or ruling on the objections. The 
popular local "justification" includes notions that unless a 
rule or statute specifies that a procedural step is 
absolutely required then it is in the discretion of the 
judge, or that laws mean what "the judge" subjectively 
interprets them to mean and nothing more or less. 
Significantly, every one of the above variations was 
prejudicial to Sew Easy and in favor of Montague. 
It is clear by controlling "objective judicial 
interpretation" that all of the above specified procedural 
acts violated Sew Easy's rights to its "due process day in 
court." The notion that the judge is free to apply a 
meaning to the rules other than their plain meaning under 
rules of construction and as interpreted by this court, so 
the judge can either vent his malice or exercise unbridled 
kingly discretion, is absurdly erroneous and is more anti-
American than a Russian Ruble. Every specified variance 
denied Sew Easy its fundamental right to notice, opportunity 
to be heard and present evidence and argument before the 
court "deprives it of its property." These fundamental 
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there are no requirements that the judge ever rule on 
discovery motions or that there are any time requirements 
for ruling because it is not "material" and not absolutely 
required under his interpretations. The spurious doctrine 
further reasons the court may sua sponte order dismissal of 
less than the whole suit even though it is obstructing 
prosecution and even though its notice specifies that the 
whole suit will be dismissed* 
The popular doctrine also holds that regardless of the 
nature or extent of intervening conflicts or grounds for 
recusal the judge may "discretionarily" stay in the case 
simply because the party has the alternative remedy of 
moving for disqualification, and concludes that his 
"hanging-in" certainly promotes judicial efficiency and 
economy. Sew Easy complains that the judge's ex-parte 
expansion of the suit dismissal hearings purpose from suit 
dismissal as noticed, to include bifurcation, partial 
dismissal, entry of a default order and judgment on the 
counter-claim, all without notice or hearing, are all extra 
legal. This complaint is viewed locally as an immaterial 
ACLU-type due process technicality contrary to judicial 
convenience and economy. 
The spurious doctrine also allowed the judge to sign 
the proposed default order the day before Sew Easy received 
the proposal and five days before the rules allowed 
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rights of Sew Easy which were violated here are implemented 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In order to dispel any notion that may exist as to 
whether the violated procedural rules hereafter discussed 
are to be interpreted to protect Sew Easy or for the 
convenience and economy of the court under Cache County 
local de facto practice we cite the following due process 
based rules of construction. The sum of the due process and 
U.R.C.P. rules violations, as later detailed, is incredible 
in this case and the following sets the stage for 
application of due process interpretations to those rules: 
"In general, when the sovereign has 
established rules to govern its own conduct, 
it will be held to the self-imposed 
limitation on its own authority, departure 
from which denies due process of law." 
This citation is from 16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 969 pgs. 
265 & 266 citing Layton v. Swapp, D.C. Utah 484 F. Supp. 
958, above which is noted: 
"Implicit in concept of due process are 
ideas that government must follow its own 
rules and that it must do so within 
reasonable time." 
The compulsory nondiscretionary nature of the sovereign's 
duty to follow its own rules is highlighted by a 
continuation of the same C.J.S. citation at page 266. 
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"and where a state has established procedure 
which comports with due process, state and 
local officials are bound to follow those 
procedures." (Citing Wolf v. Lillie v. 
Kenosha County Sheriff, D.C. Wis., 504 F. 
Supp. 1 vacated on other grounds C.A.) 
The popular notion in Cache County that rules are to be 
interpreted for the convenience and efficiency of the 
sovereign judge or his favored parties is dispelled with 
finality by this court in the case of Deseret Savings Bank 
vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923) and quoting from 
Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 as follows: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the 
authorities is that, where power is given to 
public officers, in the language of the act 
before us, or in equivalent language--
whenever the public interest or individual 
rights call for its exercise -- the 
language***though permissive in form, is in 
fact peremptory. What they are empowered to 
do for third person the law requires shall 
be done. The power is given, not for their 
benefit, but for his. 
It is placed with the depository to meet the 
demands of right, and to prevent a failure 
of justice. It is given as a remedy to 
those entitled to invoke its aid, and who 
would otherwise be remediless." 
"In all such cases it is held that the 
intent***which is the test, was not to 
devolve a mere discretion, but to impose 'a 
positive and absolute duty.'" 
Again, from Corpus Juris Secundum: 
"The due process clause require that a power 
conferred by law be exercised judiciously 
with an honest intent to fulfill the purpose 
of the law and it is a part of the judicial 
function to see that the requirement is 
met..." (16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 967 pg. 
254) 
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This court has clearly declared in harmony with the due 
process concept that a party is entitled to his day in court 
on the merits of a counter-claim and unlike other judgments 
and orders, this court gives no presumption of validity to 
default judgments and resolves all doubts in favor of 
setting aside default judgments and giving a hearing on the 
merits. This due process "day in court" rule is found in 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d. 1189: 
"Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of 
justice and fair play. No one has an 
inalienable or constitutional right to a 
judgment by default without a hearing on the 
merits. The courts, in the interest of 
justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity 
for a hearing on the merits of every case." 
See also Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d. Ill and Utah 
Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trembo, 17 Utah 198 53 P. 
1033. 
The Court's order to show cause for dismissal for lack 
of prosecution issued while the judge was blocking 
prosecution by his refusal to rule on discovery motions for 
over nine months is a gross due process violation. It also 
evinces judicial malice. However, if he had dismissed the 
whole suit as he gave notice he would do, there would have 
been no material prejudice, rather a significant benefit. A 
new complaint filing would have solved many of the rulings 
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defaults and disqualification problems faced by Sew Easy 
with this retiring judge. 
The fact that the judge expanded the noticed purpose of 
the show cause hearing into an unnoticed hearing on a 
phantom motion to enter a counter-claim default judgment is 
but further evidence of his active malice. That kind of 
judicial trickery is clearly beyond the authority of the 
court and an affront to the judicial process. A sua sponte 
dismissal for lack of prosecution to clear the calendar must 
be construed as a dismissal of the dependent compulsory 
counter-claim as well. After such dismissal of the case, 
the court clearly lost jurisdiction for the purpose of 
rendering any default judgment for either party: 21 C.J.S. 
Courts Sec. 94; Nichols v. State, 554 P. 2d. 231; Lund v. 
Third Judicial District Court, 62 P. 2d. 278; Wasatch Oil 
Refining Co. v. Wade, 63 P. 2d. 1075. This attempted 
discriminatory dismissal is especially aggravated because 
the court, burdened with malice, used the dismissal as a 
pretext and springboard for entering the default order and 
default judgment without motion, notice or opportunity for 
hearing. 
The proceedings that led to the original default and 
post-dismissal entry of the order for default and default 
judgment all violated the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
due process in the following particulars: 
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The plaintiff was never in default in reply to the 
counter-claim for tortious interference with the supplier. 
The complaint was, in law and substance, "a reply" to the 
counter-claim so there was no failure to plead or otherwise 
defend under Rule 55 (a)(1) U.R.C.P. The complaint 
inherently denied and replied to that reversed counter-
claim. Any additional reply would in substance have been no 
more than a complaint amendment. Wells v. Wells, 272 P. 2d. 
167 (Utah 1954). Under the circumstances where there had 
been a complaint, answer and counter claim and discovery was 
active on issues in dispute, no default could be entered by 
the clerk or the court under Rule 55 (a) U.R.C.P. until the 
active adverse party was by motion and notice given his 
opportunity to contest the claimed fact of a claimed default 
under Rule 7 (b) (1) U.R.C.P. Montague in both the pre and 
post dismissal default proceedings would had to have given 
notice under Rule 5 (a) U.R.C.P. Both the original precipe 
and first default also falsely stated the record facts 
regarding the nature of the claimed default and falsely made 
it appear that Sew Easy, the plaintiff, was a defendant who 
had not responded to "process" as the pretext for the 
outrageous ex-parte default entry. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the grounds that the default judgment was void 
because its entry was based upon outrageous multiple 
violations of the rules and due process, this court should 
vacate the default judgment and confirm that the case was 
dismissed without prejudice leaving the parties free to 
litigate the claims and counter-claims in another action 
which will be filed before this appeal is heard. 
Signed this f) ^day of Atfgust, 1989^ 
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